Using the evolution of the peer-to-peer music-sharing phenomenon as a springboard, this article explores the economic modalities inherent in two different
as it has been practiced in the age of media industrialists. By cultural production, I refer to those social endeavors that are considered artistic or aesthetic in nature and not usually considered to have an overtly instrumental purpose; industrial or economic endeavors, on the other hand, are typically considered to have an instrumental purpose. I also want to be clear at the outset that when I use the term media industrialist, it is not intended to be pejorative. This term is used merely as a descriptive of those individuals and corporations that were in a position to take advantage of particular economic conditions at a given historical moment. This era of media industrialism encompasses most of the 20th century and is marked by the advent of analog broadcasting and recording technologies. The article will also use the theoretical constructs as a basis for discussion of how the economic imperatives of cultural production may be reconfigured as digital media technologies become more ubiquitous.
MP3s and the Napster Phenomenon
According to Romer (quoted in an article by Oberholzer & Strumpf, 2004) , tracking the effect of downloaded music on the sale of CDs, half a billion songs a week were being downloaded from Napster during its peak in February of 2001. The music-sharing phenomenon began with the now-defunct Napster and grew exponentially from the time it was introduced in 1999. The phenomenon was a combination of technological and cultural factors that are illustrative of many of the issues widespread use of digital communication technologies have raised. Napster was the common name for both a P2P networking program and the Web site spawned by this program that allowed the widespread sharing of MP3 files.
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Adam Powell (1994) writes, At the time (and remember this was not too long ago), it was pretty difficult to imagine a world where millions of powerful desktop computers could be linked to a gigantic network with high data-transmission rates. It was also hard to imagine people having huge storage capacities on these desktop computers-and on network machines. All of these factors needed to be built into the infrastructure for something like the MP3 phenomenon to occur.
The practice of "ripping" CDs began to grow but did not become widespread until the introduction of the Napster software. Given the wide media coverage of Napster's creation and demise over the past several years, it may seem difficult to imagine that the software was not created until 1999. The Napster software suite was developed by Shawn Fanning. At a time when the "digerati" was consumed with buzzwords like "e-commerce," "e-tailing," "B2C" (business-to-consumer), and "B2B" (business-to-business), Shawn Fanning invented a "P2P" network. The program Fanning wrote made it easy for music fans to collect and exchange MP3 files over the Internet. The popu-larity of Napster grew so rapidly, it occasioned a cover story in Time in October 2000. Napster's phenomenal growth was only part of the reason it caused such a stir in the popular imagination. The issues surrounding copyrights and intellectual property rights that the widespread use of the software suite raised also fueled the furor. Karl Greenfield (2000) , the author of the generally favorable Time cover story ends his praise for the Napster software with the caveat, "and, oh yeah, it may be illegal" (Greenfield, 2000, p. 62) . Almost from the beginning, the program's popularity set off alarm bells within every sector of the music recording industry. Musicians and many of the major recording labels, as well as the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), have since filed lawsuits claiming infringement of copyright. The ability to make almostperfect copies of nearly any type of media that digital technology enables coupled with the Internet's ability to connect fans around the globe has disrupted large media conglomerates' stable and secure grip on the reproduction and distribution of cultural products.
Theoretical Perspectives: Modes of Communication
Like the Catholic Church embracing the new technology of print centuries before, the music industry was an early adopter of digital recording and reproduction technologies. Martin Luther's actions crystallized the threat print technology posed for the Catholic Church. Elizabeth Eisenstein (1983) notes, Gutenberg's invention probably contributed more to destroying Christian concord and inflaming religious warfare than any of the so-called arts of war ever did. Much of the religious turbulence of the early modern era may be traced to the fact that the writings of the church fathers and Scriptures themselves could not continue to be transmitted in traditional ways. Christianity was particularly vulnerable to revolutionary effects of typography. (p. 155) The music industry is similarly vulnerable to the revolutionary effects of digital recording technologies. Like the Catholic Church awakening to the threat of Martin Luther and the "abuse" of print technology, Shawn Fanning and the Napster phenomenon brought to the forefront of the industry's consciousness the catastrophic economic implications P2P network technologies had for the industry. Napster moved the discussions of endless copies of movies and music circulating freely around the globe from the realm of science fiction into an everyday reality. The fear and loathing the recording industry has shown for file-sharing communities and programs like Napster, KaZaA, and an ever-growing number of similar software products is rooted in the recording industry's economic stake in conceptualizing and conflating cultural production into cultural artifacts. Although this is an understandable stance for the industry to take and a commonly held conceptualization among a much wider public, I argue that this conflation is based on an incomplete understanding of two differing modes of communication and the economic implications inherent in these modes of communication.
In Communication as Culture, James Carey (1989) made some seminal observations about the nature of and relationship between communication, culture, and technology. One was that human cultures engaged in two different modes of communication. One was the transmission mode. He argued that the transmission mode of communication was the most common and familiar way to think about the process of communication because historically speaking, the separation of transportation and communication was one important consequence of the invention of the telegraph (Carey, 1989, pp. 16-17.) He also put forward the radical notion of a second mode of communication, one that he called the ritual mode. According to Carey, the transmission mode is "the commonest in our culture-perhaps in all industrial cultures" (Carey, 1989, p. 15) . Furthermore, it is formed from a metaphor of geography or transportation. In the nineteenth century but to a lesser extent today, the movement of goods or people and the movement of information were seen as essentially identical processes and both were described by the common noun "communication." The center of this idea of communication is the transmission of signals or messages over distances for the purpose of control. (Carey, 1989, p. 15) Carey argues that it is particularly easy and comfortable for humans to consider the act and process of communicating as an act of transmission or transportation. In many cases, it is not only easy and comfortable but accurate as well. Any communicative interaction that passes on new information-reading an instruction manual or textbook, listening to a lecture, sending a telegram or an e-mail message-might all be unproblematically characterized as trasmissive acts. Carey points out that whereas we commonly think of most communicative acts as transmissional, there is another mode of communication that transmits very little information. He has called this the ritual mode of communication and defines this phenomenon as one that is "directed not toward the extension of messages in space but toward the maintenance of society in time; not the act of imparting information but the representation of shared beliefs" (Carey, 1989, p. 18) . He notes that these two modes of communication are not mutually exclusive and, indeed, typically operate, to a greater or lesser degree, in tandem. In The Bias of Communication, Harold Innis (1951) presents the idea that specific communication technologies are either time biased or space biased. Innis asserts that characteristics of particular forms of communication may be "better suited to the dissemination of knowledge over time than over space." He describes the communication as being either "heavy" or "light," explaining that the "heavy and durable" medium is "not suited to transportation, or to the dissemination of knowledge over space [rather] than over time," although when the medium is "light," it is "easily transported" (Innis, 1951, p. 33 ).
Carey's theories of transmissive and ritual modes of communication have a synergistic correspondence with Innis's earlier articulation of the time or space bias of particular communication technologies. Roughly speaking, Carey's ritual mode of communication should fit more comfortably with technologies that are time biased. It is important to note that Innis characterizes media as almost always physical. Thus media that are difficult to transport are inherently more permanent and therefore time biased, and "lighter" media are easier to transport and therefore are inherently space-biased. Carey, conversely, discriminates between ritual and transmissive modes based on types of content. Carey connects the ritual mode of communication specifically with religious ceremonies, but there are a wide range of secular cultural activities and artifacts that might be said to be ritual dominant. That is to say, the primary purpose of the cultural artifact or activity is not to convey new or specific information to those who attend to such artifacts or participate in these rituals. A partial list would have to include most of today's mass-mediated entertainment products/activities, such as textual fiction, prime-time television, film/ video rentals, televised sports, and almost any form of recorded music. All these cultural forms are more prominently geared to "the representation of shared beliefs" rather than the transmission of specific information. Innis would also argue that to perform the necessary work of cultural preservation, these types of cultural activities and artifacts would need to be literally embodied in a medium or media that "is heavy and durable and not suited to transportation" (Innis, 1951, p. 33) .
In thinking about the two modes of communication that have been articulated by Carey, it becomes apparent that these modes have been operating in tandem across much if not all of human history. Bureaucratic proclamations and epic poetry both carry some information and some artifice, yet one would have to say that the former is "the transmission of signals or messages over distances for the purpose of control," whereas the latter is much more oriented to "the representation of shared beliefs." One of the major differences between the ancient and medieval world and the modern or postmodern world is the role technology plays in human communication. Superficially, there are no qualitative differences between information such as stock market quotes and the information traders extracted from shipping manifests in less technological times. Superficially, there are no qualitative differences between Aesop's fables and the types of morality plays available via any number of sitcoms, such as All in the Family, The Simpsons, The Bill Cosby Show, or Malcolm in the Middle. Yet, modern communication technologies radically alter the number of people these offerings reach and the speed with which they can be dis-tributed. This, in turn, produces qualitative changes in our societies, our sense of self, and the way we conduct our everyday lives. Looking at Innis's concept of media that are time biased or space biased, we might also note that much of modern mass-mediated entertainment-content that I have characterized as ritual-dominant-is disseminated by what Innis would characterize as spacebiased media. In fact, however, all media can now be both "heavy and durable" and "light and easily transported." In the world of digital electronic media, all media become space biased within Innis's theoretical framework because all electronic media are "easily transported."
There are strong similarities between the nature of Carey's ritual and transmissive modes of communication and Innis's concepts of time-and space-biased media-namely, the dichotomy between the function of cultural preservation and the function of bureaucratic control of space. Both theoretical constructs postulate an intimate relationship between communication technology and the functions of particular modes of communication. I would also argue that there are economic implications inherent in these theoretical constructs that are as deeply entwined with the nature of communication technology as they are with the modes of communication. Specifically, the advent of electronic communication and the ability to record and store copies of cultural performances first using crude analogue techniques and now using digital technology has changed the way cultural production is conceptualized from an economic stand point.
Recording Technologies: Cultural Performance Becomes Cultural Artifact
The case of the new media phenomenon of file-sharing and the recording industry's reaction to it stands as an exemplar of the economic upheaval that will plague all who are involved in the now-industrialized arena of cultural production. That economic upheaval is tied directly to the transformation of communication technology, but it is also tied to industry insiders' failure to understand the relationship communication technology has with the nature and function of cultural production in the broader society. It can be argued that the recording industry and the executives in charge of setting its policies confuse the production of noninstrumental cultural performances with the massproduction of cultural artifacts. The recording industry conceptualizes these products strictly (and implicitly, as it is doubtful that recording company executives spend much time thinking about communication theory) in terms of a transmissive mode of communication. As noted earlier, this is understandable, in part, because the industry holds a huge economic stake in this conceptualization. Until the advent of digital media production technology and widespread access to the Internet in modern Western cultures, cultural production in the industrial age was, indeed, almost synonymous with mass-produced cultural artifacts.
Cultural production, like other areas of production, underwent a transformation as the Industrial Revolution gathered steam. It became possible to mass-produce cultural artifacts. Books and other printed material came first, but as more sophisticated recording, transmitting, and "information storage" technologies were developed, media of all types soon were mass-produced. Like other arenas of production, the mass-production of cultural artifacts required a complex production process and an equally complex set of production technologies. The ability to record images (first still images and then moving images) and sound made it possible to turn an ephemeral cultural performance into a cultural artifact that could be mass-produced and distributed. As the 20th century progressed, it did not take long for the manufacturers and distributors of these cultural artifacts to forget that in an earlier time, most cultural production consisted of either handcrafted, one-of-a-kind artifacts, such as paintings, sculptures, or live performances. The ability to record and copy these once irreproducible cultural productions and embody them in massproduced and mass-distributed cultural artifacts elided the difference between cultural production and the cultural artifacts that were the instantiations of that production.
Modern recording and production technologies made it possible to condense cultural performance into cultural artifacts. Until the advent of these industrial-age recording technologies, Carey's ritual mode of communication (except for printed material like poetry and fiction) was almost always instantiated in performance rather than artifact. Music and plays come to mind most prominently. Until the industrial revolution, individual artists and musicians were paid directly for their performances. Their economic destiny was in their own hands. As sophisticated media technologies evolved through the 20th century cultural producers, the artists became the raw input material in a complex manufacturing and distribution process that culminated in massproduced cultural artifacts.
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Once ephemeral cultural production was captured and mass-reproduced as artifacts. These now mass-reproduced artifacts were easily commodified and widely distributed as the embodiment (literally) of the original performance. This instantiation as commodity elided the ritual nature of the original performance and encouraged the industry's conceptualization of the resulting manufacture and sale of mass-produced artifacts as an instrumental act of commerce.
The transition from a pastoral, by-hand mode of cultural production to an industrial-age assembly-line mode of mass-reproduction changed the economic parameters of this sector of society. Artists and performers became part of a complex manufacturing chain and were no longer paid directly for each performance or artifact. Control over cultural production in the Industrial Age passed from the actual producers and their traditional patrons to a new breed of patron: media industrialists. This new type of Industrial Age entrepreneur had the capital to invest in and maintain the vast complex of technology used to manufacture, reproduce, and distribute cultural artifacts. Cultural producersthe artists-succumbed to the economic blandishments of these industrialists precisely because the artists and performers did not have the capital to acquire the technology required for the reproduction and distribution of their intellectual and cultural work.
Common Knowledge Versus Instrumental Information: Virtual Economics
The widespread use of digital communication and networking technologies make the difference between the ritual nature of cultural production as a conservator of cultural heritage over time and the transmissive nature ("the extension of messages over space for the purposes of control") of the massreproduction of cultural artifacts; this concept seems obvious and distinct. It is easy for both the manufacturer and the consumer to elide the fact that the disc or CD is not the actual performance because in recorded music, it is impossible to separate the song and the media it was recorded on. Just as Carey made the case for two modes of communication, I would argue that there are two economic modalities that work in tandem with ritual and transmissive modes of communication: a proprietary modality and a communal modality. These differing modalities may be thought to be more "comfortable" with one or the other of Carey's two modes of communication. The interactions between the two different modes of communication and information that fits one modality better than the other have economic implications. From an economic standpoint, the proprietary modality fits more naturally with the transmissive mode of communication, and the communal modality fits more naturally with the ritual mode of communication. The reasons are simple. For instrumental information to attain or retain its economic value, it must be held proprietary. For ritual communication to attain or retain economic value, it must be widely disseminated and held communally.
In his chapter on the economics of online cooperation, Peter Kollock (1999) details the different ways that exchanges of information on the Internet can be construed. He discusses both gift economies and the concept of public goods. Kollock might argue that the MP3s members of P2P networks exchange are properly defined as public goods. He writes, A public good is defined by two characteristics. First, it is to some degree nonrival in that one person's consumption of the good does not reduce the amount available to another. One person's viewing of a fireworks display, for example,
does not reduce what can be seen by another person. Second, a public good is to some degree non-excludable in that it is difficult or impossible to exclude individuals from benefiting from the good-one receives the benefits of a national defense system regardless of whether one pays taxes. (p. 223) I argue that much of what I have been calling cultural production might come under the heading of "public goods." These public goods in many cases can be characterized as common knowledge, which most comfortably fits under the rubric of the ritual mode of communication. It is common in the sense that this is communal information that is a common resource that is freely circulated. It also fits the definition of public goods in that it is both nonrival and nonexcludable. In fact, Carey (1989) implicitly argues that in these virtual public goods, common knowledge is the product of the ritual mode of communication and is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of social structure especially over time. He writes, I wish to suggest that thought is predominantly public and social. It occurs primarily on blackboards, in dances, and in recited poems. Thought is public because it depends on a publicly available stock of symbols. This particular miracle we perform daily and hourly-the miracle of producing reality and then living within and under our own productions-rests upon a particular quality of symbols: their ability to be both representations "of" and "for" reality. (Carey, 1989, pp. 28-29) There is a vast range of cultural production that we, and indeed all societies, use to maintain the common knowledge that is our social structure. Much of the work of preserving this common knowledge has been conducted by religious institutions and institutionalized secular education. However, much of this cultural production is less formally circulated in the main by music, television, paintings, film, sculpture, and other types of cultural production whether they are high art or pop culture. Regardless of the medium, these essentially are stories we tell ourselves about who we are and who we should be both individually and collectively. In the absence of the free circulation of these narratives, community withers and dies. Not only is this common knowledge necessary to the maintenance of community, but also the only way an economic benefit can be derived from it is based on it becoming widely available.
In contrast, let us explore instrumental information-information that operates in proprietary modality a little more fully. It is perhaps telling that much of the writing about new media and digital communication technologies uses the term information in a generic and all-encompassing way. As noted above, much of cultural production seems to fit more appropriately in the ritual mode. Although ritual communication is indeed widely circulated, it is not generally thought to contain new or useful information. Much of this common knowl-edge is characterized as entertainment and thought of as material that should be engaged in as a leisure activity. On the other hand, instrumental information, information whose economic modality is more properly thought of as proprietary, is something that is used and closely held. Circulation is prohibited or restricted. Knowledge has always represented power. Proprietary information is held closely precisely because it conveys to its possessor some sort of advantage-military, political, or economic.
Vincent Mosco (1989) characterizes information as a unique sort of raw material; he views information as "valuable raw material in its own right" and a product that lends value to aspects of "production labour, capital, and other raw materials" (p. 23). He distinguishes information as particularly valuable because it is "non-depletable," and in his words, "it can be used, but not used up" (p. 23). Note the similarity to one aspect of the concept of public goods: One person's use of public goods does not diminish their availability or usefulness to another product. Inherent in this characterization is the notion that as a raw material, albeit an insubstantial one, information is a commodity, but because it "can be used but not used up," it must be closely held-kept proprietary-for it to retain its economic value.
Patents and copyrights have traditionally been the methods used to protect ownership rights for intellectual property. Laurie Thomas Lee (2000) defines intellectual property as encompassing "the intangible mental work products of authors and creators" (p. 149). This mental work may include writings, trade symbols, processes, and secrets. Furthermore, "Unlike most tangible goods, information rights exist separately from any particular copy of the information, permitting the owner to maintain rights to the work while distributing copies" (p. 149), and property rights may be distributed to many different people and across organizations. Note that this definition specifically differentiates between the information designated as property and the physical manifestations of that information in tangible copies. However, first it becomes important to explore how instrumental information (as opposed to cultural production or ritual communication) acquires and retains value.
For instrumental information to retain its value, a method needs to be devised to exclude unauthorized access. According to Mosco (1989) , information can only become a commodity or proprietary information-that is to say, subject to ownership-after two conditions have been met. First, buyers and sellers must be able to define what it is, "preferably in a precise, quantitative form." The second is the ability to determine when an exchange has been consummated and to devise ways to measure the exchange. Mosco adds that the intangible and fleeting nature of information has made these two conditions difficult to meet. He goes on to note that print marks the beginning of our ability to meet these conditions (p. 26). He does not comment on the notion that books are the physical instantiation of information, which is a significant omission. Notice also that he implicitly characterizes information as useful in a very instrumental sense. This leads inevitably to a transmissive view of information-the notion that it can be moved from one point to another and that it can be measured, bought, and sold. Contrast this with Carey's characterization of ritual communication and the notion that it must be shared to be valuable. Mosco certainly appears to feel that digital technologies meet the criterion of measurability of this resource despite the fact that it is, by nature, intangible. He writes,
The reduction of information to a common digital code and the ability to process and transmit this coded information instantaneously make it possible to measure information and monitor information transactions with considerable quantitative precision. These developments have augmented the possibilities for packaging and repackaging information in a marketable form. (pp. 26-27) Mosco focuses on aspects of digital information that seem to emphasize metering and measuring information for purposes of bureaucratic or industrial control, which conforms tightly to Carey's definition of the transmissive mode. To this end, Mosco implicitly uses a fluid metaphor. Information is measured in terms of keystrokes per employee, the number of minutes or seconds it takes to complete routine tasks, or time spent for a long distance telephone call. Measurements are made to the flow of information, and the measurement of this information is almost always in the service of some instrumental agency. In this conceptualization, information is metered and charged for in the same way water or electricity might be metered and charged for. Implicit in this is the notion that information is proprietary, must be controlled, and loses its value if control and metering functions are lost. He makes passing reference to the commodification of cultural production: "The information and video industries can package and repackage bits of information or video material in an infinite range of marketable configurations" (Mosco, 1989, p. 27) . Key in this sentence is the idea that a cultural production or performance is synonymous with its package. Absent is any consideration about why this type of "information" might be of value, however.
Mosco also articulates two kinds of proprietary information based on how control over the information is maintained. The first is related to the idea of information as a flow and is closely connected to information as a useful resource or raw material. Whether it flows downstream and is charged for by a unit of time or other measurement like bits or bytes or it flows upstream and is measured in keystrokes per employee or "hits" on a Web page, the method of control is monitoring the flow and metering it. This is instrumental information that fits best in the transmissive mode and into the proprietary economic modality. The second kind of information is cultural production and performance. The method of control needed to keep this sort of information propri-etary rests on an ability to control the industrial manufacturing apparati of reproduction, which results in discrete tangible packages, such as books, CDs, videotapes, and CD-ROMs that can then be sold as objects. Lee's (2000) notion of corporate ownership in her definition of intellectual property becomes key to the economic control of ritual communication. Screenwriters, musicians, and other cultural producers in the Industrial Age have traditionally been the beginning of the manufacturing and distribution chain that results in mass-produced cultural artifacts. The economic value of cultural production has always been difficult to quantify, which exempts it from Mosco's first method control-metering the flow.
Because cultural production does not lend itself easily to the metering process, control of this manufacturing and distribution process was (and is) essential to the media industries. The reproduction and distribution technologies condense ephemeral cultural production into tangible, mass-produced cultural artifacts. In fact, the concept of copyright has worked to protect intellectual labor as an integral part of the manufacturing process from its inception. In his forthcoming book, Karl-Erik Tallmo (in press) revisits the wording of the preamble of the Statute of Anne, codified by British lawmakers in 1710 as the first copyright law.
Whereas Printers, Booksellers, and other Persons, have of late frequently taken the Liberty of Printing, Reprinting, and Publishing, or causing to be Printed, Reprinted, and Published Books, and other Writings, without the Consent of the Authors or Proprietors of such Books and Writings, to their very great Detriment, and too often to the Ruin of them and their Families. (Tallmo, in press) It is precisely this process of condensation into the physical from the virtual that allows media industries to maintain the control of the intangible resources-cultural capital-that can be "used but not used up." In the modern industrial age, it has been the instantiation into the physical that allows media industries to force the communal modality of a ritual mode of communication into a proprietary economic modality of the transmissive mode. This process allows it to be held as well as metered and, thus, retain its economic value. This is possible precisely because media industrialists have the means to mass-(re)produce and distribute cultural artifacts.
The profound difference between instrumental information that assumes a natural proprietary modality in the transmissive mode and cultural production that normally operates in the ritual mode and requires a communal modality is the way the value of that information is derived. As I have repeatedly argued, for instrumental information to retain its value, it must be closely held. For cultural production functioning in the ritual mode, to accrue value, it must be widely shared. Some critical portion of a community must become aware of a given cultural production before it gains currency. These cultural productions need to be widely circulated to gain this currency. These sorts of communicative acts closely fit Carey's (1989) characterization of ritual communication, which are geared to "the maintenance of society in time; not the act of imparting information but the representation of shared beliefs."
Transforming the Communal to the Proprietary: Copyright and "First Sale"
In a time before the industrial age of media production, the work of maintenance and representation of shared beliefs was done by priests, wandering troubadours, epic poets, painters, and sculptors among others. Innis notes this implicitly in his description of the rise of lyric poetry.
The power of the oral tradition was evident in the Homeric poems and in the adaptability of the hexameter to a wide variety of content. Hesiod's poetry was in sharp contrast with that of Homer. It facilitated the break of the individual from the minstrel tradition. The demands for greater sensitivity were met by the development of elegiac and iambic poetry. With the accessibility to papyrus from Egypt in the late seventh and sixth centuries and the use of the lyre as musical instrument the position of minstrels was weakened. Lyric Poetry developed on an impressive scale. (Innis, 1951, p. 41) Cultural maintenance was done in person and by hand and they were paid piecemeal and on the spot. See, for example, Jack Goody's (1986) work on the transition from oral to scribal culture and Eisenstein's brief discussion on the economic transition from monks transcribing religious texts to scribes producing secular texts (Eisenstein, 1983, pp. 8-10) .
In the industrial age of mass-produced cultural artifacts, media artists like musicians, novelists, and film directors became merely the first link in a modern manufacturing chain, ceding much of their productions'value to the industrialists who had the capital necessary to reproduce and distribute them to a wider audience. The mass-production of cultural artifacts played a key role in the evolution of more complex social structures. It would be difficult to argue that societies composed of hundreds of millions or even billions of individuals could cohere without the wide circulation of cultural productions made possible by mass media. In the past, the key to this ability to distribute ritual information widely enough to maintain the cultural cohesion of societies of such vast proportions lay explicitly in the ability to instantiate these offerings in physical form. Before the industrial age of media, this was not possible. See Carolyn Marvin's (1988, pp. 192-202) book When Old Technologies Were New for a discussion of how our own pre-or protoelectronic culture speculated about the effect of the hypothetical "telectroscope" would have on culture and society.
Copyright, despite its current popular conceptualization as a method to encourage artistic and intellectual innovation by preserving economic incentives for creators of cultural production, was initially an instrument of governmental control of seditious information and a specific response to the disruptive effect of another new technology, the printing press. As European authorities enacted controls and censorship over the explosion of troublesome literature as a reaction to the printing press, the British government allowed only members of a recognized guild to print at first, and the printing was allowed only in London, Oxford, and Cambridge (de Sola Pool, 1998, p. 330) . In his classic work, the Areopagedca, John Milton protested a British act in 1643 that required printers to apply for licenses before printing; American law adopted Milton's view of licensing publications as anathema; it is what the courts call "prior restraint" on speech, which is not allowed under the First Amendment (de Sola Pool, 1998, p. 330) .
Despite its repressive origins, the current rationale for such legal codifications as copyrights and patent rights is explicitly centered on providing an incentive to contribute new and innovative knowledge toward the common good. These legal codifications are put in place to address the articulated concern about the nonexcludable nature of public goods. Even if it were desirable, it is probably impossible to exclude every individual from benefiting from a public good. Kollock (1999) asserts that all members "in a group may be made better off by the provision of a public good, but that in no way guarantees that it will be produced." He explains that whereas "excluding others from consuming the public good is difficult or impossible, there is the temptation to free-ride on the efforts of others, enjoying a public good without contributing to its production" (p. 223). In his analysis, he concludes that if all people attempt to "free-ride," the public good will no longer be produced, no one will be able to consume it, and a larger social dilemma is created (p. 223).
Patents and copyrights are regulatory attempts to ensure that some economic benefit is retained despite the fact that it is difficult, even impossible, to preclude access to intellectual resources. It is important to understand that these regulatory strategies rest at their foundations on particular reproduction and distribution technologies. This has been true from the very beginning of mass media, as de Sola Pool writes:
The concept of copyright is rooted in the technology of print. The recognition of a copyright and the practice of paying royalties emerged with the printing press. When numerous copies were reproduced in one place, it became easy to identify the source of the copies and how many had been made. That plant was the practical place to apply any control or fiscal accounting. (de Sola Pool, 1990, p. 254) Note the emphasis on accounting for physical artifacts and the mechanisms of mass-(re)production. In addition to the fact that these strategies are rooted in the physical instantiations of cultural production, on more theoretical level, they are rooted in the attempt to "force" ritual communication into a transmissive mode. This problem is at its base centered on conflicting economic imperatives. The first imperative is to derive economic benefit from cultural productions by holding them proprietary. This is self-defeating because to attain some economic value, these works need to be widely distributed. The second imperative is to distribute cultural works as widely as possible. This is self-defeating because as these works become more ubiquitous and become "community property," their value diminishes. The legal strategies of patent and copyright work reasonably well as long as cultural and intellectual production must be instantiated physically. The capital-intensive nature of mass-(re)production makes it difficult and inconvenient to mass-produce unauthorized copies. The nature of digital media technologies changes this equation. Digital technologies reveal a previously overlooked flaw in these legal strategies that is teleologically connected to the physical instantiation of these cultural artifacts. The doctrine of "first sale" acknowledges the regulatory response to the economic paradox inherent in the ritual mode of communication that most cultural production operates in and its connection to industrial age manufacturing and reproduction processes (Soules, 2002) . The United States Supreme Court in 1909 favored the Right of First Sale as part of the Copyright Act of 1909, citing its purpose as the promotion of "science and the useful arts" through the diffusion of knowledge, and they mandated that authors benefit from their works' distribution because it spread their work, fostering not only new knowledge but also sales (Soules, 2002) .
Because these artifacts are distributed in tangible form, the notion of first sale arose to acknowledge that the purchaser of the artifact (first applied to books and other printed material) not only had actual control over the disposition of the artifact but had some right to the contents of that artifact as well. The doctrine of first sale is the notion that once an artifact is purchased, the purchaser can then dispose of that particular copy in any way he or she might desire. They might, for instance, sell a used book to a half-priced bookstore or to another individual without compensating the copyright holder, whether that be the author or some corporate entity. They might also lend the book to a friend to read without further compensating the copyright holder. Both of these examples demonstrate how this type of unauthorized circulation might cause economic harm to the copyright holder. The first sale doctrine makes needed concessions to the legal strategy of copyright because it does not make a distinction between the physical and therefore transmissive nature of cultural artifacts as opposed to the metaphysical and ritual nature of the intellectual enterprise embedded within that artifact. Digital recording and reproduction technologies have made the connection between the doctrine of first sale and the conceptualization of cultural production as an artifact obvious. Legal arguments surrounding the doctrine of first sale become torturous. Hyde (2001) writes that whereas "a person should be able to sell her legally obtained copy of a phonorecord, the composers and producers of the song must be able to recoup their investment in their work." Digital reproduction and distribution of already reproduced copies is so simple that it seems "almost counterintuitive" to purchase a legally obtained copy when it is so easy for another person to e-mail it to you for free, and the process is so easily enacted that only one hard copy can easily be multiplied to one hundred copies within a very short amount of time, still leaving the composers and producers with payment for only one of the copies (Hyde, 2001 ). Hyde concludes,
In order to ensure incentive to create new works, composers must be able to limit this. Thus when the artist sells the digital phonorecords to the customer, regarding that sale as a transfer of possession of a digital phonorecord, rather than a transfer of title, is more conducive to underlying Copyright policy. (p. 4) Hyde specifically acknowledges the artist or composer as the holder of the copyright when, in fact, artists and composers must usually relinquish their copyright to the manufacturers of mass-reproductions of the original work. The doctrine of first sale acknowledges two key facts. The first is that it is impossible to track the circulation of mass-produced cultural artifacts beyond the first sale; and second, that the economic effect of such circulation to the copyright holder is negligible because it is difficult and expensive to make physical copies of these works.
Digital phonorecords also differ from other phonorecords because there exists unlimited and unchecked reproduction ability in the digital realm. This ability is distinct from the reproductions made during the utilization of the digital phonorecord (RAM copy made for listening) and is arguably the more problematic issue for Copyright owners. While it is possible to make reproductions of more traditional phonorecord formats, the process is expensive and laborintensive. The most difficult common-format phonorecord to reproduce is likely the vinyl record, because reproduction requires a machine that measures and records the physical grooves of the master record and then cuts individual vinyl copies after this. Analog tape is easier, but the more generational copies you make, the lower the sound quality becomes. CD's are much easier because massive machines exist to "burn" hundreds of copies simultaneously, but the media used can be expensive. (Hyde, 2001, p. 4) Digital media technologies have changed that economic equation in a radical way. The P2P phenomenon is just one example of how the doctrine of first sale becomes an intolerable threat to media industrialists whose economic base is the sale of mass-(re)produced cultural artifacts. Members of P2P communities and their supporters have made the argument that what they are engaged in is not rampant piracy and wanton copyright violation, but rather, they are merely exercising their rights of ownership of an artifact that they have legitimately purchased under the doctrine of first sale.
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They argue, with some merit, that they have legitimately purchased the latest Jewel or Matchbox 20 CD and therefore have the right to listen to it and share it as they please. 4 The widespread use of multimedia-capable, Internet-connected personal computers makes it possible for them to share their tunes globally and massively. Individuals involved in trading MP3 files through P2P networks are not profiting economically and, in theory, are simply exercising their traditional ownership rights under the doctrine of first sale. Despite the fact that the RIAA and large music companies claim the widespread practice of sharing music through P2P networks has caused them great economic harm, Oberholzer and Strumpf's (2004) recent study indicates that it is unclear whether any decrease in CD sales is indeed attributable to the practice. It is, however, clear that the economic advantage accrued by the ability of media industrialists to transubstantiate common knowledge into proprietary artifacts and "force" ritual communication into a transmissive mode by condensing it into physical goods is evaporating.
This upheaval has generated some rather absurd scenarios. For instance, the RIAA successfully sued the owners of Napster, claiming that Napster was facilitating massive copyright violations and effectively put Napster out of business. The RIAA continues to pursue participants in P2P file sharing, filing suit against 261 individuals in September 2003 and an additional 532 individuals in January 2004 (CNN Moneyline, 2004) . On another front, the United States Supreme Court has ruled in favor of writers in a case in which a group of freelance writers sued The New York Times, demanding compensation from the Times for articles that they have allowed to be placed on for-profit databases such as Lexus-Nexus (Bugeja, 2001) . The Times argued that it would be too difficult to track down all these articles and that it would cause harm to librarians, researchers, and scholars by removing from the public record valuable public information. Both situations concern attempts to derive economic benefit by holding proprietary information that must be widely distributed to derive economic value.
Intellectual Property Versus Community Property: Reconfiguring the Relationship As the title of this section implies, the long and tempestuous relationship between media industrialists and the producers of ritual communication is foundering and in need of reexamination to maintain fruitfulness and profit on both sides. While media industrialists struggle to maintain control over a man-ufacturing and marketing infrastructure that is increasingly superfluous, musicians are exploring new ways to share their art with their fans that will allow them to reap the economic rewards for producing new and culturally relevant forms of ritual communication. Consumers are in the enviable position of being courted by both the industrialists and the musicians. Digital communication technologies have skewed the balance of the newly fragile association among the three parties. It remains to be seen how the economic rewards of producing the common knowledge that is our community property will be divided among them and how their relationship will be reconfigured.
Industrial (analog) methods of media production favored the commodification of cultural artifacts and set distributors up as gatekeepers because of the expenses associated with industrial-age production equipment, including the printing press, film and television recording equipment, television and radio transmission equipment, and music recording equipment. Digital technologies of production and distribution drastically reduce the cost of sharing cultural performance and production, and as these technologies spread and become ubiquitous, these performances and productions can now be shared without resort to the massive and expensive technological apparati traditional industrial-age distributors of cultural commodities invested so heavily in. It is clear that digital communication technologies are here to stay and, it is equally clear that the widespread use of these technologies will radically alter the relationships between media producers, media industrialists, and media consumers.
How might producers of cultural artifacts take economic advantage of the digital technology to become marketers and distributors of their own work, thereby wresting economic control of their intellectual labor from the media industrialists who now own it? How might they reconfigure the economic model that is based on the notion that the value of information is derived from the fact that it is closely held to one that provides economic rewards based on how widely the cultural artifacts they produce are shared? There are several different notions about how this might be accomplished. One essentially reverts to the preindustrial-media era in which artists, musicians, and other cultural producers pass a digital "hat." An example of this can be seen at Tipjar.com (http://www.tipjar.com), where individuals put electronic cash in artists'virtual tip jars in accordance to how much they enjoy the digital recording of a performance. Another possibility is some form of central clearing house for collecting payment for cultural production similar to the role ASCAP and BMI now perform in ensuring that copyright holders are compensated for the use of their intellectual property. A third alternative may be a decentralized technology-based micropayment system based on the development of so-called trusted systems as outlined by Mark Stefic (1999) in his book The Internet Edge.
The role media industrialists will play in this new digital environment is equally muddy. Although they have been reviled for the economic force they have exerted on cultural production and for their insensitivity to issues other than economic, they have, nevertheless, played an important role in the distribution and circulation of the common knowledge necessary to maintain the social cohesion of societies that span continents. The technological infrastructure of mass-(re)production and distribution of cultural artifacts that they financed stands to become increasingly irrelevant and may disappear as the new digital technologies take hold. Manufacturers and distributors may no longer be needed by media producers and no longer be necessary components in the social mechanism to circulate common knowledge. They may find their economic salvation in their ability to display and entice consumers to access cultural production. They may also find roles as gatekeepers and metering agents, controlling the flow of cultural information rather than the manufacture and distribution of cultural artifacts. Whatever their role becomes, there will still be some period of transition defined by new media producers who find no economic benefit in relinquishing their intellectual property rights to these media industrialists in exchange for the use of their mass-reproduction/ manufacturing infrastructure. The media industrialists will hold the copyrights of the industrial age of media, but their access to and control of new cultural resources may eventually wither away. One thing is certain, they will not relinquish their economic control of cultural production willingly or easily. The recent legal offensive launched against individuals engaged in file sharing by the RIAA is proof of this.
It remains to be seen how these relationships will be renegotiated. It is clear, however, that networked digital media technologies have a transformative potential similar to the transformative nature of the printing press. Carl Sagan (1977) characterized the key difference between humans and other species as humans' ability to create "extrasomatic knowledge"-the ability to create and store information outside our bodies. James Carey (1989) has suggested the invention of the telegraph as the historical moment communication became separate and distinct from transportation. I would like to suggest that digital communication technologies make distinct the theoretical difference between transmissive communication and ritual communication and the distinct economic modalities these two modes of communication foster. These technologies disrupt the notion that cultural artifacts and the cultural production embedded in those artifacts are one and the same thing. These abstract distinctions between digital media technologies and industrial media technologies are what carry the digital media's transformative potential. This transformative potential will, like the printing press and the telegraph, radically alter the way we produce and circulate the valuable cultural resources needed to maintain a coherent culture-the cultural resources that are our community property. Notes 1. The original MPEG audio standard was developed by Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft in the late 1980s and through successive improvements evolved into MP3 in the early 1990s. The development of the MP3 standard significantly reduced the bandwidth needed to transmit digital audio files over the Internet and, along with the evolution of larger and cheaper computer storage and processing capacity, made it possible-even easy-to store and play back music on desktop computers. A brief history of the technical development of the MP3 format may be found at the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft Web site (see Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, 2003) .
2. It should be noted that from a historical point of view, the ability to transmit information electronically preceded the ability to record that information in either analog or digital formats. An argument could be made that radio and television provide counter examples to the argument I am making about the economic consequences of the conflation of cultural production into mass-produced cultural artifact. I would argue that although this is true, especially before electronic recording was developed, the media industrialists were forced to find an economic alternative to the sale and distribution of cultural artifacts. That alternative was advertising, in which the costs of the production of these cultural performances were hidden from the consumer.
3. For a musician's view on First Sale, please see A Musicians Take on File Sharing, DRM, and Copyleft Licensing by Miriam Rainsford (2003) .
4. For a more complete discussion of the Doctrine of First Sale, see works by Calaba, Soules, Klinefelter, and Reese among many others.
